Forslag til europaparlaments- og rådsforordning om endring av forordning (EF) nr. 562/2006 når det gjelder styrking av kontroller mot relevante databaser ved de ytre grensene
Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders
Kompromiss fremforhandlet mellom Europaparlamentet og Rådet 5.12.2016
BAKGRUNN (fra Kommisjonens fkataark, engelsk utgave)
Targeted Revision of the Schengen Border Code
Why is this revision of the Schengen Borders Code necessary?
The Commission's proposal responds to an explicit request in the Council conclusions of 9 and 20 November 2015, which invited the Commission to "present a proposal for a targeted revision of the Schengen Borders Code to provide for systematic controls of EU nationals, including the verification of biometric information, against relevant databases at external borders of the Schengen area, making full use of technical solutions in order not to hamper the fluidity of the movement".
Effective controls at the external Schengen borders is essential for maintaining the internal Schengen area of free movement. These controls are part of the measures needed to manage threats to the internal security of Member States. As recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated, EU citizens can also be perpetrators of attacks, and their right to free movement can be exploited to avoid detection, in particular when returning from foreign conflict zones. Controls at the external borders will allow us to identify such persons and minimise risks to the internal security of the Schengen area.
What changes does the Commission propose?
The proposed amendment introduces the obligation to carry out systematic checks at the external borders on all persons, including those enjoying the right of free movement under Union law (i.e. EU citizens and members of their families who are not EU citizens), in order to verify that such persons do not represent a threat to public order and internal security. Systematic checks of EU citizens are today possible only in relation with the authenticity and validity of their travel documents.
Third-country nationals are already subject to document and security checks against relevant databases upon entry, but Member States have some leeway in carrying out security checks upon exit. The proposal explicitly imposes the obligation to carry out such checks on third country nationals upon exit.
Checks on all third country nationals and EU citizens will now be mandatory both when entering and when exiting the European Union. The systematic checks against databases will include consultation of the Schengen Information System, the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database and relevant national systems.
The proposal also reinforces the need to check against biometric identifiers (facial image and fingerprints) as security elements in the passport of EU citizens in order to make them more secure and establish a reliable link between the holder and the passport. Therefore in case of doubts on the authenticity of the passport or on the legitimacy of the holder, border guards should verify these biometric identifiers.
Will this proposal lead to lengthy queues at the external borders?
Technological developments allow border agencies to check against relevant databases without delaying the process of crossing the border, as the controls on documents and persons can be carried out in parallel. Where there is evidence that a systematic consultation of databases on all EU citizens could have a disproportionate impact on the flow of traffic at the border, Member States can decide to carry out only targeted checks against databases at some land and sea border crossings provided that a risk assessment shows this does not lead to risks related to internal security, public policy, international relations of the Member States or a threat to the public health.
How will the protection of fundamental rights be ensured?
The systematic checks in the databases are done on a 'hit/no hit' basis. Using the databases like this means that personal data rights are only impacted to a very limited extent, and justified by the security objectives.
Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet