BAKGRUNN (fra kommisjonsforordningen)

(1) Pursuant to Article 56(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, the criteria set out in Article 43(1) of that Regulation for classifying asset-referenced tokens as significant asset-referenced tokens are to apply also for classification of e-money tokens as significant e-money tokens. Therefore, it is necessary to further specify the criteria referred to in Article 43(1), points (e) and (f), of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 also in relation to e-money tokens.
(2) To enable the European Banking Authority (EBA) to determine whether the activities of the issuer of the asset-referenced token or e-money token are significant on an international scale outside the Union, and whether asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens or their issuers are to be considered to be interconnected with the financial system, it is necessary to distinguish between core and ancillary indicators for such determination. Core indicators should capture the most relevant elements of significant asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens. Ancillary indicators should be assessed where the assessment of the core indicators by the EBA does not enable the EBA to determine conclusively that the criteria referred to in Article 43(1), points (e) and (f), of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 have been fulfilled. The outcome of the significance assessment should be subject to a holistic assessment of both types of indicators.
(3) As regards the assessment of the criterion of significance of the activities of the issuer on an international scale outside the Union, including the use of the asset-referenced token or e-money token for payments and remittances, as referred to in Article 43(1), point (e), of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, the EBA should use core indicators relating to cross-border activities between the Union and third countries, the size of the token concerned, and the issuer’s activities at global level.
(4) Cross-border transactions, in particular those that are associated to uses as a means of exchange, are the transactions with the international dimension that are most likely to pose risks to financial stability, monetary policy transmission and monetary of the Union. Those transactions also reflect the international activity of an issuer of an asset-referenced token or e-money token on international scale outside the Union in relation to their uses for payments and remittances. Therefore, the EBA should consider the indicators of the significance of the market share of value of cross-border transactions in an asset-referenced token or e-money token into and from the Union and the significance of the estimated market share of value of such transactions that are associated to uses of such tokens as a means of exchange. The indicator of the significance of the market share of value of cross-border transactions in an asset-referenced token or e-money token should be further divided in two separate sub-indicators relating to inflow transactions and outflow transactions, since the effects of each type of transaction on financial stability and monetary sovereignty can be different.
(5) To capture the non-cross border aspect of significance of an issuer’s activities on international scale, the EBA should also consider the core indicators on the global market capitalisation of an asset-referenced token or an e-money token, and on the global market capitalisation of all asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens issued by the issuer. The market capitalisation on an international scale of a token should be understood to include the same token issued outside the Union to distinguish that capitalisation from the market capitalisation referred to in Article 43(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114.
(6) As regards the assessment of the criterion of significance of the interconnectedness of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens or their issuers with the financial system, as referred to in Article 43(1), point (f), of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, the indicators should capture direct and indirect interconnectedness of the tokens and their issuers with the financial system. Both a direct and an indirect interconnectedness could result in contagion effects in both directions, that is from issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens to traditional financial system and vice versa. For that purpose, it is necessary to set out the core indicators of the significance of the share of non-deposit reserve assets that are financial instruments issued by financial institutions, and of the significance of the share of the issuer’s asset holdings relative to the total supply of specific financial instruments. In addition, the following ancillary indicators should be set out: the ownership structure of the issuer of an asset-referenced token or an e-money token, the concentration of custody of the issuer’s reserve assets, and portfolio overlap of the issuer’s reserve assets with the reserve assets of issuers of other asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens.
(7) Assessing the significance of the share of non-deposit reserve assets that are financial instruments issued by financial institutions is key when assessing the issuer’s interconnectedness with the financial system. That core indicator should measure direct interconnections with the financial sector via the issuer’s reserve of assets. Distress in financial institutions the financial instruments of which are included in the reserve assets could affect the value of the reserve assets that back the token holders’ claims on the issuer to redeem the token. When assessing that indicator, the EBA should consider the sub-indicators of the share of non-deposit reserve assets that are financial instruments, of the share of non-deposit reserve assets that are derivatives in case of asset-referenced tokens, or of the share of covered bonds in case of e-money tokens. The share of non-deposit reserve assets that are derivatives and the share of covered bonds are necessary as sub-indicators since, on the one hand, counterparties of derivatives might be credit institutions and therefore a margin call on them could have significant effects on the financial system, and, on the other hand, a fire sale of covered bonds by the issuer could negatively impact the liquidity of credit institutions.
(8) The core indicator on the significance of the share of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens issuer’s asset holdings relative to the total supply of the specific financial instruments, including units of an undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities and sovereign bonds, should capture indirect interconnections between, on the one hand, issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens and, on the other hand, the financial system. Such indirect connections could affect the traditional financial system, in particular where the issuer of an asset-referenced token or an e-money token is forced to fire sell its asset holdings because of financial distress. That sell-off could drive down the value of those assets and affect financial institutions indirectly via a decrease of the value of the assets those financial institutions hold. (9) Issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens can also be interconnected with the financial system through the ownership structure. That ancillary indicator should provide a complete view of the potential effects that financial distress could have in the financial system, not only from a purely financial stability risk perspective, but also in connection to reputational risks. Financial distress or critical events in the issuer of an asset-referenced token or e-money token could, via their link to the issuer through the ownership structure, have a significant effect in institutions that run other financial activities. When assessing that indicator, the EBA should focus on whether the issuer has a dispersed or concentrated ownership, whether natural or legal persons with qualifying holdings are financial institutions, and the complexity of the ownership structure.
(10) An additional channel of interconnectedness between, on the one hand, the issuer of an asset-referenced token or e-money token, and, on the other hand, the financial system, can arise via the concentration of reserve assets in a small number of financial institutions. The higher the diversification of an issuer’s reserve assets, the lower the potential contagion effects and financial stability risks of the issuer. Thus, allocating reserve assets in a low number of financial institutions or in a highly concentrated degree is an indication of higher interconnectedness with the financial system. Because of the specific relevance of interconnectedness that may arise from the concentration of deposits in credit institutions, it is appropriate to set two sub-indicators under the ancillary indicator of concentration of issuer’s reserve assets in financial institutions. One sub-indicator should capture concentration of reserve assets in financial institutions, and another sub-indicator should cover only deposits in credit institutions.
(11) It is necessary to capture the contagion mechanisms that could arise from cases where there are different issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens holding similar assets. Such situation could have as a result that financial distress and the resulting sell-off in one issuer could have negative effects on other issuers. An ancillary indicator of a portfolio overlap of the issuer’s reserve assets with the reserve assets of other issuers should therefore be set out,