Kommisjonens gjennomføringsbeslutning (EU) 2025/469 av 12. mars 2025 om fastsettelse av regler for anvendelse av europaparlaments- og rådsforordning (EU) 2021/696 med hensyn til utvelgelsen av Unionens romværtjeneste for underkomponenten for romværhendelser i Unionens romprogram
EUs romprogram (2021-2027): gjennomføringsbestemmelser om underkomponenten for romværhendelser
Kommisjonsbeslutning publisert i EU-tidende 14.3.2025
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(fra kommisjonsbeslutningen)
(1) Risks of extreme and major space weather events may threaten the safety of citizens and disrupt the operations of space-based and ground-based infrastructure. In response to these risks, the Space Weather Event (‘SWE’) sub-component has been established as part the Space Situational Awareness component of the Union Space Programme.
(2) In accordance with Article 60 of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, the Commission is to select the SWE services to be provided at Union level.
(3) Article 60(2), point (b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 lists the different domains that might be considered for the Space Weather service, which are the space, transport, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), electric power grids, and communications. In line with Article 45(2), point (c) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, the Galileo component of the Union Space Programme will provide space weather information relevant to GNSS, via the GNSS Service Centre.
(4) In accordance with the contribution agreement between the Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA) on the implementation of parts of the Union Space Programme and Horizon Europe under the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement, ESA launched a study to assess the needs to each SWE user, the technological readiness of the services and a risk assessment in accordance with the criteria listed in Article 60(2), point (a). Based on that assessment, the services that was selected included power systems, telecommunication, and space domains. Furthermore, the study showed that the space domain service had the most amount of technical mature service products, and the ability to best reduce the risks linked to extreme space weather events.
(5) Based on this study, the Commission has prioritised the space domain service as best suited to be selected for the SWE service. Due to budgetary constraints, only one service could be selected.
(6) The SWE risks to the space domain include radiation storms that can damage spacecraft electronics leaving them unusable in the worst case, and geomagnetic storms that can dramatically increase drag, hereby affecting the predicted trajectory of space objects, consequently complicating spacecraft operations and Space Traffic Coordination temporarily. The users of a space domain SWE service should therefore include spacecraft operators, and Space Traffic Coordination entities, such as Space Surveillance and Tracking entities.