REMIT og ACER: endringsbestemmelser om beskyttelse mot markedsmanipulasjon i energimarkedet
BAKGRUNN (fra europaparlaments- og rådsforordningen)
(1) Open and fair competition in the internal markets for electricity and for gases and ensuring a level playing field for market participants requires integrity and transparency of wholesale energy markets. Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishes a comprehensive framework (‘REMIT’) to achieve this objective. To enhance the public’s trust in functioning energy markets and to protect the Union effectively against attempts of market manipulation, Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 should be amended to further increase insufficient transparency and monitoring capacities as well as to ensure more effective investigation and enforcement of potential cross-border market abuse cases addressing the shortcomings identified in the current framework.
(2) Financial instruments, including energy derivatives, traded on energy markets are of increasing importance. Due to the increasingly close interrelation between financial markets and energy wholesale markets, Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 should be better aligned with the financial market legislation such as Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 17 , including with respect to the definitions of market manipulation and inside information respectively. More specifically the definition of market manipulation in Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 should be slightly adjusted to mirror Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. To that end, the definition of market manipulation under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 should be adjusted to capture the entering into any transaction, or issuing any order to trade, but also any other behaviour relating to wholesale energy products which: (i) gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products; (ii) secures, or is likely to secure, by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or several wholesale energy products at an artificial level, or (iii) employs a fictitious device or any other form of deception or contrivance which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals regarding the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products.
(3) The definition of inside information should also be adjusted to mirror Regulation (EU) 596/2014. In particular, where inside information concerns a process which occurs in stages, each stage of the process as well as the overall process could constitute inside information. An intermediate step in a protracted process may in itself constitute a set of circumstances or an event which exists or where there is a realistic prospect that they will come into existence or occur, on the basis of an overall assessment of the factors existing at the relevant time. However, that notion should not be interpreted as meaning that the magnitude of the effect of that set of circumstances or that event on the prices of the financial instruments concerned must be taken into consideration. An intermediate step should be deemed to be inside information if it, by itself, meets the criteria laid down in this Regulation for inside information.
(4) This Regulation is without prejudice to Regulations (EU) 596/2014, 600/2014 and 648/2012, and Directive (EU) 2014/65 as well as to the application of European competition law to the practices covered by this Regulation.
(5) Sharing of information between national regulatory authorities and the national competent financial authorities is a central aspect of cooperation and detection of potential breaches in both the wholesale energy markets and the financial markets. In the light of the exchange of information between competent authorities pursuant to Regulation (EU) 596/2014 at national level, national regulatory authorities should share relevant information they receive with national financial and competition authorities.
(6) Where information is not, or no longer, sensitive from a commercial or security viewpoint, the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (the ‘Agency’ or ‘ACER’) should be able to make that information available to market participants and the wider public with a view to contributing to enhanced market knowledge. This should include the possibility for ACER to publish information on organised market places, IIPs, RRMs according to applicable data protection laws in the interest of improving transparency of wholesale energy markets and provided it does not distort competition on those energy markets.
(7) Organised market places which carry out activities relating to the trading of wholesale energy products that are financial instruments under Article 4(1)(15) of Directive (EU) 2014/65 shall be duly authorized pursuant to the requirements of that Directive.
(8) The use of trading technology has evolved significantly in the past decade and is increasingly used on the wholesale energy markets. Many market participants use algorithmic trading and high frequency algorithmic techniques with minimal or no human intervention. The risks arising from these practises should be addressed under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011.
(9) Compliance with the reporting obligations under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 and the quality of the data that the Agency receives is of utmost importance to ensure effective monitoring and detection of potential breaches to achieve the objective of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011. Inconsistencies in the quality, formatting, reliability and cost of trading data have a detrimental effect on transparency, consumer protection and market efficiency. It is essential that the information received by the Agency is accurate and complete for it to effectively carry out its tasks and functions.
(10) To improve the Agency’s market monitoring and make data collection more complete, the current reporting regime needs improvement. The data collected should be expanded to overcome gaps in the data collection and include coupled markets, new balancing markets, contracts for balancing markets and products that have potential delivery in the Union. Organised market places should be required to provide the full order book data set to the Agency. Order book providers should also be designated as persons professionally arranging transactions subject to the obligation to monitor and report suspected breaches.
(11) Inside Information Platforms (IIPs) should play an important role for the effective and timely publication of inside information. It should be mandatory to disclose inside information on dedicated IIPs to make the information easily accessible and enhance transparency. To ensure trust in the IIPs they should be authorised and registered.
(12) To streamline and make the reporting of data to the Agency more effective, the information should be provided through Registered Reporting Mechanisms (RRMs) and the operation of RRMs should be authorised by the Agency. The RRMs should at all times comply with the conditions for authorisation and data protection law. The Agency should also establish a register of all RRMs in the Union.
(13) In order to facilitate monitoring to detect potential trading based on inside information and data quality of collected information, the collection of inside information needs to be aligned with the current processes for trade data reporting.
(14) Persons professionally arranging and executing transactions have the obligation to report suspicious transactions in breach of the provisions on insider trading and market manipulation. To enhance the possibility of enforcement of such breaches, the persons professionally arranging transactions should also have the obligation to report suspicious orders and potential breaches of the obligation to publish inside information. Direct electronic access providers and shared order-book providers should be considered as persons professionally arranging transactions.
(15) Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management foresees the possibility of third country participation in the Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling in the electricity sector. Since the market coupling operator uses a specific algorithm to match bids and offers in an optimal manner, this may result in orders to trade being placed in a third country participating in the Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling but resulting in a contract for the supply of electricity with delivery in the Union. The placing of such orders to trade in third countries participating in the Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling that may result in delivery in the Union should be covered by the definition of wholesale energy product pursuant to this Regulation.
(16) In order to obtain an accurate, objective and reliable assessment of the price for LNG deliveries to the Union, the Agency should collect all the LNG market data that are necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment. The price assessment should be undertaken based on all transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union. ACER should be empowered to collect this market data from all participants active in LNG deliveries to the Union. All such participants should be obliged to report all of their LNG market data to ACER as close to real time as technologically possible either after the conclusion of a transaction or the posting of a bid or offer to enter into a transaction. The ACER price assessment should comprise the most complete dataset including transaction prices and, as of 31 March 2023, bids and offer prices for LNG deliveries to the Union. The daily publication of this objective price assessment, and of the spread established in comparison to other reference prices on the market in the form of an LNG benchmark, paves the way for its voluntary uptake by market participants as the reference price in their contracts and transactions. Once established, the LNG price assessment and the LNG benchmark could also become a reference rate for derivatives contracts used for hedging the price of LNG or the difference in price between the LNG price and other gas prices.
(17) Delegation of tasks and responsibilities can be an effective instrument to reduce duplication of tasks, foster cooperation and reduce the burden imposed on market participants. Therefore a clear legal basis should be provided for such delegation. National regulatory authorities should be able to delegate tasks and responsibilities to another national regulatory authority. Introducing specific conditions and limiting the scope for the delegation to what is necessary for the effective supervision of cross-border market participants or groups should be possible. Delegations should be governed by the principle of allocating competence to an authority which is best placed to take action on the subject matter.
(18) A uniform and stronger framework to prevent market manipulation and other breaches of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 in the Member States is necessary. Penalties for breaches of that Regulation should be proportionate, effective and dissuasive and reflect the type of the breaches, taking into account the ne bis in idem principle. Administrative sanctions, penalty payments and supervisory measures are complementary parts of an effective enforcement regime. A harmonised supervision of the wholesale energy market requires a consistent approach among national regulatory authorities.
(19) To date, the supervision and enforcement of activities under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 have been the responsibility of the Member States. Market abuse behaviours are increasingly cross-border in nature, often affecting several Member States. Enforcement action against cross-border market abuses can present jurisdictional challenges relating to the identification of the national regulatory authority that would be best placed to pursue the investigation in question.
(20) Market abuse cases involving multiple cross-border elements and market participants established outside the Union are also particularly challenging from an enforcement perspective. The current supervisory set-up is not appropriate for the desired level of market integration. The absence of a mechanism to ensure the best possible supervisory decisions for cross-border cases, where joint action by national regulatory authorities and the Agency currently requires complicated arrangements and where there is a patchwork of supervisory regimes must be addressed. There is therefore a need to set up an efficient and effective supervisory and investigatory regime for this type of market abuse cases, which cannot, due to its Union wide features, be addressed by Member State action alone.
(21) The investigation of breaches of this Regulation with a cross-border dimension should be carried out through a uniform process at Union level. Complexity of cross-border cases and the need to ensure sufficient resources for such cases requires involvement of the Agency, in particular in more integrated energy market. Since the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, the Agency has gained significant experience in monitoring and collecting relevant data on the wholesale energy markets in the Union to ensure their integrity and transparency. Building on this experience, the Agency should be empowered to carry out investigations to fight against the breaches of the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011. The Agency should carry out such investigations in cooperation with the national regulatory authorities with the purpose of supporting and complementing their enforcement activities. Equally, in the context of an investigation by the Agency, where necessary, relevant national regulatory authorities should cooperate amongst each other in assisting the Agency.
(22) The Agency should be empowered to carry out investigations by conducting on-site inspections and by issuing requests for information to the persons under investigations, in particular where the suspected breaches of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 have a clear cross-border dimension. In undertaking the on-site inspections and in issuing requests for information to the persons under investigations, the Agency should closely and actively cooperate with the relevant national regulatory authorities, which in turn should provide the Agency with full assistance, including where a person refuses to be subject to the inspection or to provide the requested information. It is important that the procedural guarantees and fundamental rights of the persons concerned of the persons subject to the Agency’s investigations are fully respected. The confidentiality of the information submitted by the persons subject to the investigation should be safeguarded exchanged in accordance with applicable Union data protection rules.
(23) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective,