Delegert kommisjonsforordning (EU) 2023/2830 av 17. oktober 2023 om utfylling av europaparlaments- og rådsdirektiv 2003/87/EF om fastsettelse av regler om tidsskjema, administrasjon og andre sider ved auksjonering av utslippskvoter for klimagasser
Auksjoneringsforordningen 2023: detaljerte bestemmelser for auksjoner av CO2-kvoter
BAKGRUNN (fra kommisjonsforordningen)
(1) Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union (EU ETS) was revised and amended by Directive (EU) 2023/959 of the European Parliament and of the Council to align it with Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council setting a target of at least 55 % net emission reductions by 2030 compared to 1990.
(2) Since 2012, emission allowances have been auctioned in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 providing for rules on the timing, administration and other aspects of the auctioning of allowances under Directive 2003/87/EC, ensuring that the auctioning of allowances is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonised and non-discriminatory manner through a well-functioning process.
(3) Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 needs to be changed to take account of the new rules and elements introduced in Directive 2003/87/EC, including the extension of the scope of the existing emission trading system to maritime transport and the introduction of a new and separate emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and industrial activities not covered by the existing emission trading system. It is also necessary to address changes in the auctioning of allowances for the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Social Climate Fund introduced by Article 10e, Article 10a(8b) and Article 30d(3) and 30d(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, as well as changes in the functioning of the Innovation Fund pursuant to Article 10a(8) of that Directive. In addition, it is appropriate to clarify and fine-tune existing provisions in Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010, based on the lessons learned from its implementation.
(4) The extent of the necessary changes to the current rules requires that a new regulation is adopted. Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 should therefore be repealed.
(5) Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC lays down the principles for the auctioning of allowances. The auctioning should be predictable, in particular as regards the timing and sequencing of auctions and the estimated volumes of allowances to be made available. According to that Article, it is to be ensured that auctions are designed to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises covered by the emissions trading system have full, fair and equitable access, that small emitters are granted access, that participants have access to information at the same time, that participants do not undermine the operation of the auctions, and that the organisation of and participation in the auctions is cost-efficient avoiding undue administrative costs.
(6) This Regulation should apply to the auctioning of all allowances covered by Directive 2003/87/EC.
(7) Article 10(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC requires Member States to auction allowances to stationary installations covered by Chapter III of that Directive not allocated free of charge. Thus, Member States must auction allowances not allocated free of charge. They may not use any other means of allocation, nor could they withhold or cancel allowances not allocated for free instead of auctioning them.
(8) From 2024, emissions from maritime transport will be included in the EU ETS. Directive 2003/87/EC provides that the rules on auctioning of allowances are to apply to maritime transport activities in the same manner as they apply to other activities covered by the EU ETS.
(9) The method for establishing the total quantity of allowances to be allocated for aviation, and the method for establishing the share of those allowances to be auctioned have been changed with a gradual phase out of free allocation for the aviation sector by 2026. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the specific rules to determine the volume to be auctioned each calendar year in respect to aviation in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC.
(10) In Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1122, the definition of general allowances has been amended to include all allowances issued after 1 January 2025 pursuant to Chapter III of Directive 2003/87/EC, all allowances created for maritime transport activities pursuant to Article 3ga of that Directive and all allowances created for aviation activities pursuant to Article 3c and Article 3d of that Directive. It is therefore necessary to ensure that those allowances are jointly auctioned in the same bidding windows from 1 January 2025.
(11) From 2027, Directive 2003/87/EC provides for a separate emissions trading system for fuels used in buildings, road transport and additional sectors which correspond to industrial activities not covered by Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC, such as the heating of industrial facilities. Specific rules need to be established for the auctioning of those allowances, in particular to ensure a smooth start of operations of the separate emission trading system.
(12) For reasons of simplicity and accessibility, allowances should be auctioned by way of a standardised electronic contract, made available for delivery within two trading days. Such short-term delivery deadlines limit any potential negative impact on competition between the auction platforms and trading places in the secondary market for allowances. Moreover, short-term delivery deadlines are simpler and encourage wide participation, thereby mitigating the risk of market abuse. They also ensure better accessibility for small and medium-sized enterprises covered by the system and for small emitters.
(13) To ensure fairness and cost-efficiency and to address the need to mitigate the risk of market abuse, auctions should be carried out by means of a single-round, sealed-bid and uniform-price format. Moreover, tied bids should be resolved by means of a random process, as this generates uncertainty for bidders who could potentially collude on the price.
(14) In view of legal certainty and transparency, this Regulation should contain detailed provisions on other aspects of auctioning such as lot size, the possibility to withdraw or modify submitted bids, the currency used for bidding and for payment, the submission and processing of applications for admission to bid, as well as any refusal, revocation or suspension of admission.
(15) The auction clearing price can be expected to be closely aligned to the prevailing secondary market price. Where an auction clearing price is significantly under the prevailing secondary market price, it is likely to indicate a deficiency of the auction. Allowing such an auction clearing price to prevail could distort the carbon price signal and disturb the carbon market and it would not ensure that bidders pay fair value for the allowances. Therefore, it is necessary to determine a reserve price on the basis of the prevailing secondary market price during the bidding window. Where the reserve price is not cleared, the auction should be cancelled. However, providing for cancellation of auctions should not be applicable for the start of an auctioning system when a sufficiently liquid secondary market is not yet established, which is the case for the new emissions trading system for fuels used in buildings, road transport and additional sectors. Therefore, it is necessary to derogate from the requirement to determine a reserve price for the initial period of auctions of allowances covered by Chapter IVa of Directive 2003/87/EC until a sufficiently liquid relevant secondary market is established.
(16) In order to safeguard the integrity of the auctions, an auction platform should be able to cancel an auction when that auction may be disrupted. To avoid the accumulation of volumes in case several auctions are cancelled, it should be possible to distribute the cancelled volumes evenly over subsequent auctions that do not already include cancelled volumes from previously cancelled auctions.
(17) A relatively high frequency of auctions is desirable in order to limit their impact on the functioning of the secondary market, whilst ensuring that auctions are large enough to attract sufficient participation. Such high frequency reduces the risk of market abuse, as it decreases the value at stake for bidders in individual auctions and increases their flexibility to make use of later auctions to adjust their trading positions. For those reasons, the frequency should be at least weekly. Given the much smaller volume of allowances in respect of aviation, the appropriate frequency for auctions for such allowances should be at least once every two months. However, to ensure a smooth start of the auctions of allowances covered by Chapter IVa of Directive 2003/87/EC, it is necessary to allow for less frequent auctions at the start of the system. If this flexibility is used, it will result in a higher volume of allowances for each auction, which might be necessary to meet the initial demand for allowances on the spot market before a sufficiently liquid secondary market is established.
(18) As a rule, the volume to be auctioned in each calendar year should be equal to the volume of allowances attributed to that year. The auction volume is to be established each year in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive 2003/87/EC.
(19) The allowances for the aviation sector, the maritime sector and the sector of stationary installations should be auctioned together from 1 January 2025. In 2024, the allowances for the maritime sector and for stationary installations are to be auctioned together. As the new emission trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors is established as a separate system, its allowances are to be auctioned separately from the allowances for the aviation sector, the maritime sector and the sector of stationary installations.
(20) To provide predictability to the carbon market, it is necessary to establish clear rules and procedures for determining, well before the beginning of each calendar year, a detailed auction calendar, with all relevant information for each individual auction. Any subsequent changes to the auction calendar should only be possible in certain situations. Any adjustments should be made in a manner which affects the predictability of the carbon market the least and the revised calendars should be published, when possible, well in advance of the date when the revision takes effect.
(21) Open access is required to encourage participation and, thereby, ensure a competitive auction outcome. Equally, confidence in the integrity of the auction process, in particular vis-à-vis participants seeking to distort the auctions by using them as a vehicle for money laundering, terrorist financing, criminal activity or market abuse is a pre-requisite for ensuring auction participation and a competitive auction outcome. To ensure the integrity of the auctions, access to the auctions should be subject to minimum requirements with regard to adequate know-your-customer and eligibility checks. To ensure the cost-effectiveness of such checks, eligibility to apply for admission to the auctions should be given to easily identifiable, well-defined categories of participants, notably operators of stationary installations, aircraft operators, shipping companies and regulated entities covered by the emissions trading system, as well as regulated financial entities such as investment firms and credit institutions. Business groupings of such operators and regulated entities should also be eligible to apply for admission to bid in the auctions.
(22) Participants should be able to choose whether to access the auctions directly via the internet or dedicated connections, or through authorised and supervised financial intermediaries. For that purpose, they should be able to choose other persons authorised by the Member States to bid on their own account or on behalf of clients of their main business, where their main business is not the provision of investment or banking services, subject to such other persons complying with investor protection measures and customer due diligence measures equivalent to those applicable to investment firms.
(23) In order to ensure equal and transparent access to the auctions, it should not be possible to make admission to the auctions dependent on becoming a member of or a participant in the secondary market organised by the auction platform or any other trading place operated by the auction platform or by any third party. However, participants in the secondary market organised by an auction platform that are otherwise deemed eligible should be admitted to auctions without further admission requirements. An auction platform should refuse or revoke access to auctions in certain well-defined circumstances that may affect the integrity of the auctioning system.
(24) Each Member State should appoint an auctioneer, who is to be responsible for the auctioning of allowances on behalf of the appointing Member State. It should be possible for the same auctioneer to be appointed by more than one Member State. The auctioneer should be responsible for auctioning the allowances on the auction platform and for receiving and disbursing the auction proceeds. It is important that agreements between the Member States and their auctioneers are compatible with the agreements between the auctioneer and the auction platform, and in case of any conflict the agreements between the auctioneer and the auction platform should prevail.
(25) It is essential to ensure the integrity of the auctioneers. Therefore, when appointing the auctioneer, Member States should consider with priority candidates with the least risk of conflict of interest or market abuse having regard in particular to their activities on the secondary market, if any, and their internal processes and procedures to mitigate the risk of conflict of interest or market abuse, without affecting their ability to fulfil their tasks, in a timely manner, in accordance with the highest professional and quality standards. In order to comply with the rules against market abuse, Member States should be expressly prohibited from sharing any inside information regarding the auctions with their auctioneer. Contravention of that prohibition should be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
(26) Directive 2003/87/EC provides for the auctioning of allowances for the Innovation Fund to support innovation in low-carbon technologies, for the Modernisation Fund to improve energy efficiency and to modernise the energy systems of certain Member States, and for the Recovery and Resilience Facility to foster independence, security and sustainability of the Union’s energy supply. Those allowances should be auctioned on the auction platform appointed by the Commission and the Member States participating in the joint action to appoint that platform (‘common auction platform’) in accordance with the principles and modalities of the auctioning process. To this end, the European Investment Bank (EIB) should be the auctioneer for those funds without becoming part of the joint procurement procedure for the common auction platform. The relevant volumes of allowances should be auctioned at the same auctions as the volumes auctioned by the Member States participating in the joint action to procure the common auction platform.
(27) For the volume of allowances to be auctioned for the Innovation Fund and for the Recovery and Resilience Facility, it is necessary to take into account the objectives set by Directive 2003/87/EC for the respective funds, the resources available and the revenue already raised. In order to ensure transparency and predictability for market participants, a minimum annual volume to be auctioned for the Innovation Fund before any transfer to the Recovery and Resilience Facility should be established. Since Directive 2003/87/EC establishes for the Recovery and Resilience Facility overall auction revenue targets, initial annual volumes to be auctioned for that facility should also be established. It is also necessary to establish a procedure for revising the auction volumes in case the auction revenues are considered insufficient to meet the revenue target set in Directive 2003/87/EC. In case the auction volumes are not sufficient, it should be possible to adjust the auction calendars to schedule additional volumes to be auctioned for the Recovery and Resilience Facility. If the targeted auction revenue is accumulated earlier, the auctioning of allowances for the Recovery and Resilience Facility should be suspended in accordance with the relevant provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1122, and the auction calendar should be revised in due course.
(28) A Social Climate Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council will provide dedicated funding to Member States to support the most affected vulnerable groups, especially households in energy or transport poverty affected by the inclusion of the emission from the fuels used in the buildings and road transport sector in Directive 2003/87/EC. The Social Climate Fund will be funded from the auctioning of allowances from the existing EU ETS and of allowances from the new emissions trading for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors.
(29) To ensure transparency and predictability for market participants, initial annual volumes to be auctioned for the Social Climate Fund in 2027 should be established. Initial annual auction volumes should not be established for the period 2028-2032 in view of the commitment taken to incorporate the Social Climate Fund in the Union budget from the post-2027 Multi-annual Financial Framework. For reasons of efficiency, the Commission should serve as auctioneer for the allowances to be auctioned for the Social Climate Fund. To ensure that sufficient revenue is raised from the auctioning of allowances to meet the annual amount to be allocated to the Social Climate Fund , the annual volumes of allowances under Article 30d(3) and 30d(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC to be auctioned for the Social Climate Fund should be distributed between January and August of each year. Since Directive 2003/87/EC determines auction revenues targets for the Social Climate Fund, it is necessary to establish a procedure for revising the auction volumes where the targeted auction revenues are reached before the set period or where they are insufficient. The auction calendar should be revised to include additional allowances to be auctioned between September to December in the case of a shortfall of revenue. If the targeted auction revenue is accumulated earlier, the auctioning of allowances for the Social Climate Fund should be suspended in accordance with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1122 and the auction calendar should be revised.
(30) Article 12(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC provides the possibility for, and strongly encourages Member States to cancel allowances from their auction volumes in the event of closure of electricity generation capacity in their territory, for which a notification procedure is to be established by this Regulation. The Member State concerned should notify the Commission of its intention to cancel allowances using a uniform template providing evidence and information about the closed installation, the maximum volume to be cancelled and the timing of the cancellation, as well as a methodology for determining the exact volumes to be cancelled annually. This should be communicated annually no later than 31 May of the second year after the notification of the intent to cancel the allowances. To preserve the functioning of the market stability reserve established by Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the volume of the cancellation should be deducted from the auction volumes of the Member State only after the adjustments for the market stability reserve have been made for the respective year. If the volume to be cancelled does not exceed 5 million allowances, the volume of the cancellation should be deducted from the allowances to be auctioned by the relevant Member State between September and December of that year. If the volume to be auctioned exceeds 5 million allowances, the volume of the cancellation should be deducted over a period of 12 months starting from September to minimise the impact of that cancellation on the market. To ensure transparency, the Commission should publish the information provided by the Member States in accordance with the template, except where that information is protected for reasons of confidentiality.
(31) A common auctioning infrastructure where a common auction platform conducts the auctions based on harmonised rules for the auctioning of the different type of emission allowances best achieves the overarching objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC. Such an approach is the most cost-effective means of auctioning allowances without an undue administrative burden that would necessarily ensue from using multiple auctioning infrastructures. It best provides for open, transparent and non-discriminatory access to the auctions, both de jure and de facto. Such a common approach would ensure the predictability of the auction calendar and best strengthens the clarity of the carbon price signal. A common auctioning infrastructure is particularly important for providing equitable access to small and medium-sized enterprises covered by the emissions trading system and to small emitters. A common auction platform facilitates the widest participation from across the Union and, thereby, best mitigates the risk of participants undermining the auctions by using them as a vehicle for money laundering, terrorist financing, criminal activity or market abuse.
(32) The conduct of the auctions, the establishment and management of the auction calendar and various other tasks relating to the auctions, such as maintaining an up-todate website accessible throughout the Union, require joint action by the Member States and the Commission. The need for such joint action is derived from the Unionwide ambit of the emissions trading systems, the overarching policy objectives of Directive 2003/87/EC, and the fact that the Commission is directly responsible under that Directive for the detailed implementation of a number of features of the emissions trading system. Therefore, the competitive procurement process for the appointment of the common auction platform should be carried out through a joint procurement by the Commission and the Member States, within the meaning of Article 165(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(33) The specific procedures to be followed for the procurement of the common auction platform should be specified in an agreement between the Commission and Member States, in which the practical modalities for the evaluation of the requests for participation, for the tenders and for the award of the contract, as well as the law applicable to the contract and the competent court for hearing disputes, should be set out as required by Article 165(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.
(34) To mitigate any risk of reduced competition in the carbon market, it should be possible for Member States to opt-out of the common auction platform by appointing their own auction platforms (‘opt-out auction platforms’). Appointed opt-out platforms should be listed by the Commission in in Annex III to this Regulation. Such listing should be based on a notification of the opt-out platform by the appointing Member State to the Commission and an assessment by the Commission.
(35) Competition between different potential auction platforms should be ensured by the competitive procurement process for the appointment of the auction platform where required by either Union or national procurement law. The auction platform should be connected to at least one clearing system or settlement system. Opt-out auction platforms should be appointed for a limited period of maximum 3 years, renewable for another 2 years during which the arrangements governing all auction platforms should be reviewed. Providing for a period of 3 years for the opt-out auction platform is designed to ensure a minimum term of appointment for the opt-out platform whilst allowing the appointing Member State to join the common platform if it chooses to do so after the 3 year period has elapsed, without prejudice to the ability of the appointing Member State to renew the appointment of the opt-out platform for a further 2 years pending the outcome of the review by the Commission. Upon expiry of each appointment period, there should be a new competitive procurement process where a procurement process is required by either Union or national procurement law.
(36) To simplify the reappointment of opt-out platforms, listing under this Regulation should only be required for new entities or for re-listing of an entity under changed conditions. Thus, in case the same opt-out platform is appointed by a Member State under the same conditions, its listing should be prolonged under the same terms and conditions as the initial listing. That prolongation should be subject to a confirmation from the Member State and the Commission that the requirements of this Regulation and the objectives of Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC are satisfied.
(37) Subject to any applicable Union or national public procurement rules, including those concerning the avoidance of conflicts of interest and maintaining confidentiality, it should be possible to grant Member States not participating in the joint action to procure the common auction platform observer status in whole or in part in the joint procurement process upon terms and conditions agreed between the Member States participating in the joint action and the Commission in the joint procurement agreement. Such access will facilitate convergence between the opt-out auction platforms and the common auction platform with respect to aspects of the auction process that are not fully harmonised.
(38) In view of ensuring a smooth start of auctions for the new emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, established under Chapter IVa of Directive 2003/87/EC, and facilitating the coordination and integration with the auction platforms for the existing EU ETS, the possibility to opt-out from the common auction platform should not apply for the auctioning of such allowances for buildings, road transport and additional sectors.
(39) In view of the possibility of having multiple opt-out auction platforms appointed by different Member States, as well as a common auction platform, it is necessary to establish in detail the tasks of and the services to be provided by the auction platforms, such as providing access to and conducting auctions, managing auction calendars, publishing and notifying the auction results, as well as providing to the Commission and the competent authorities any information necessary for safeguarding the integrity of the auctioning system and the carbon market. In order to ensure smooth transition between incumbent and newly appointed auction platforms, all auction platforms should also determine an exit strategy.
(40) In order to make use of the organisational infrastructure available on the secondary market for the administration of the auctions, it is necessary to require that an auction platform is a regulated market. In particular, regulated markets are bound under Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on market abuse, to provide a number of safeguards in the conduct of their operations. The requirement that the auction platform is a regulated market has various advantages. It allows relying on the organisational infrastructure, experience, capabilities, and transparent mandatory operational rules of the market. This is relevant, inter alia, with regard to the clearing or settlement of transactions, as well as monitoring compliance with the market’s own rules and with other legal obligations such as the prohibition of market abuse and the provision of extra-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms. This is cost-effective and helps safeguard the operational integrity of the auctions. The conflict-of-interest rules of regulated markets laid down in Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 require the auctioneer to be independent of the auction platform, its owners or its market operator so as not to undermine the sound functioning of the regulated market. Moreover, many potential participants in the auctions will already be either members of, or participants in, the various regulated markets active on the secondary market.
(41) Since 2018, allowances are classified as financial instruments by Directive 2014/65/EU. Previously, only derivatives of allowances were as financial instruments. That classification brings the secondary market spot trade in allowances within the scope of, inter alia, Directive 2014/65/EU, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. However, the process of auctioning of allowances (primary market) is only covered by Regulation (EU) No 596/2014.
(42) In order to further enhance the integrity and transparency of the European carbon market and to improve regulatory reporting and market monitoring in the market of emission allowances and derivatives thereof, to promote the prevention and detection of market abuse and help in maintaining orderly markets for emission allowances and related derivatives, it is necessary to establish an obligation for the auction platform to report the complete and accurate details of every auctioning transaction to their competent national authority designated under Directive 2014/65/EU and also to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Such reporting will enhance the efficient monitoring of auctions in emission allowances and relevant linkages with the secondary market.
(43) Directive 2003/87/EC requires Member States to determine the use of revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances. For the avoidance of doubt, it should be required to transfer the auction proceeds directly to the auctioneer or other entity appointed by each Member State for this purpose.
(44) To ensure reliability and integrity of the auctioning process, allowances should be delivered to successful bidders against payment of the entire sum due to the auctioneer. Where successful bidders fail to pay the due sums in their entirety within the set deadline, sanctions for such failure should be set out in order to remedy and deter default of payment.
(45) In order to ensure a successful and reliable auction process, allowances to be auctioned should be transferred prior to the opening of a bidding window. The transfer of the allowances should be done by the Union Registry into a nominated account therein and held in escrow by the clearing system or settlement system acting as custodian. The allowances should be held in escrow until delivery of the allowances to successful bidders pursuant to the results of the auction. The next step in the process should also be set out, namely the delivery by the clearing system or settlement system of the allowances auctioned by one or more Member States to the successful bidders.
(46) Given that the auctioning of allowances consists of their primary issuance into the secondary market instead of their direct allocation to operators and aircraft operators free of charge, the clearing systems or settlement systems should not be bound by any obligations of performance with regard to the delivery of allowances to successful bidders or their successors in title in the event of any failure in delivery that is outside their control. Thus, the successful bidders or their successors in title should, in the event of any such failure to deliver auctioned allowances, be required to accept deferred delivery.
(47) Since the Member States are only required to deliver the allowances, they should not be required to deposit collateral other than the allowances themselves when auctioning. Thus, Member States should, when auctioning two-day spot contracts, only be subject to an obligation to pre-deposit the allowances to be auctioned into an escrow account held in the Union registry by the clearing system or settlement system acting as custodian.
(48) However, it is necessary for an auction platform, including any clearing system or settlement system connected to it, to implement adequate collateral processes and any other risk management processes necessary to ensure that auctioneers receive full payment for the allowances auctioned at the auction clearing price regardless of any payment default by a successful bidder or its successor in title
(49) To ensure transparency and level playing field between auctioning and secondary market, it is appropriate for the structure and level of fees applied by auction platforms and the clearing system or settlement system connected to them to be no less favourable than comparable fees and conditions applied to transactions on the secondary market. In the interests of transparency, all fees and conditions should be comprehensible, detailed and publicly available. As a general rule, the costs of the auction process should be covered by the fees paid by the bidders as set out in the contract appointing the auction platform. However, it is important for the procurement of a cost-effective common auction platform for Member States to participate in the joint action from the outset. For this reason, it is appropriate that Member States participating in the joint action at a later stage can be required to bear their own costs and for the amounts of those costs to be deducted from the costs otherwise borne by bidders. Such provisions should, however, not disadvantage Member States wishing to participate in the joint action following the expiry of the appointment of an opt-out platform. Neither should Member States be disadvantaged when they temporarily participate in the joint action due to the absence of listing of a notified opt-out platform. The auctioneer should pay only for access to the auction platform, if anything. The costs of the clearing and settlement system, if any, should be borne by the bidders.
(50) To ensure a competitive procurement process for auction platforms, it should be possible to increase the maximum level of fees to be paid by the successful bidders in a limited manner where this is provided for by the procurement documents and only during the years where the annual auction volumes are reduced by more than 200 million allowances due to the operation of the market stability reserve.
(51) Due to their status of regulated market, the auction platforms should monitor the behaviour of bidders and notify the competent national authorities in the event of market abuse, money laundering and terrorist financing, in line with the reporting obligations laid down in Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 and Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council .
(52) In order to ensure a fair and competitive auctioning process, an auction platform should be provided with the option to impose a maximum limit on what a single bidder can bid for, expressed as a share of the total volume of allowances to be auctioned in individual auctions or over a given calendar year. Activation of this option should be subject to obtaining the Commission’s prior opinion thereon. Before giving its opinion, the Commission should consult the Member States on the proposal made by the auction platform. The Commission’s own assessment of whether the market for emissions allowances is sufficiently protected from market abuse should be expressed in its opinion.
(53) To ensure flexibility and integrity of the auctions, it is also appropriate that persons authorised by Member States to bid on behalf of clients of their main business abide by the rules provided for in this Regulation to ensure that their clients are adequately protected.
(54) In view of legal certainty and transparency, detailed provisions should be laid down on other aspects of auctioning such as publication, announcement and notification of the auction results, protection of confidential information, correction of errors in any payment or allowance transfer made and any collateral given or released, and the right to appeal the decisions of the auction platform.
(55) It is necessary to provide for the language regime applicable to any auction platform, in a way that ensures transparency and balances the objective of non-discriminatory access to the auctions with the need for cost-efficiency. Documentation not published in the Official Journal of the European Union should be published in a language customary in the sphere of international finance, namely English.
(56) Member States should have the possibility to provide, at their own cost, for the translation of all documentation into their national official language or languages. Where a Member State chooses to do so, opt-out platforms should also translate all documentation into that language or those languages, at the cost of the Member State that has appointed the opt-out platform concerned. As a corollary, an auction platform should be able to handle all oral and written communications from applicants for admission to bid, persons admitted to bid or bidders bidding in an auction, in any language where a Member State has provided for a translation to that language at its own cost, if the auction platform is requested to do so by such persons. In such case, the auction platforms should not be allowed to charge such persons for the additional cost of the translation. Instead, that cost should be borne equally by all bidders on the auction platform concerned to ensure equal access to the auctions throughout the Union.
(57) In order to ensure predictable and timely auctions, this Regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.