(Utkast) Delegert kommisjonsforordning (EU) .../... av 13. desember 2024 om utfylling av europaparlaments- og rådsforordning (EU) 2023/1114 med hensyn til tekniske reguleringsstandarder som spesifiserer justering av egne pengekrav og minimumfunksjoner av stress-testingsprogrammer for utstedere av aktiva-baserte verdier eller kryptoverdier
Europeisk rammeverk for markeder for kryptoverdier (MiCA): stress-testingsprogrammer
Utkast til delegert kommisjonsforordning sendt til Europaparlamentet og Rådet for klarering 13.12.2024
Bakgrunn
BAKGRUNN (fra kommisjonsforordningen)
(1) Requirements set out in Article 35(3) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 also apply to electronic money institutions issuing significant e-money tokens in accordance with Article 58(1), point (b), of that Regulation and, where required by the competent authority under Article 58(2) of that Regulation, to electronic money institutions issuing e-money tokens that are not significant.
(2) When assessing the circumstances requiring higher own funds for issuers of assetreferenced tokens or e-money tokens, the competent authorities should consider the impact a failure of the tokens could have on financial stability, including large-scale redemptions, trigger of sales at extremely discounted prices due to financial distress of reserve assets or deposit withdrawals, potentially causing significant market disruptions, possible negative consequences for funding, and systemic risks across the financial system.
(3) Given the novelty of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens and their issuers, no universal risks assessment framework exists. Therefore, when deciding whether an increase in own funds requirement is justified, competent authorities should perform the evaluation on any relevant issuers on a case-by-case basis following a broad assessment of all the relevant risk criteria set out in Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114. Requiring a possible increase of own funds requirements should depend on issuer-specific circumstances. Issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens that are subject to such own funds requirements should always be adequately capitalised for the risks they face. All relevant historical and current information available should be used for the said broad assessment and evaluation. Generally, increases in own funds requirements should only be requested when there is a higher degree of risk, which is not already covered, and the measures of the relevant issuer are insufficiently effective to reduce the risks.
(4) Where a competent authority requires an increase in own funds requirements of the issuer of tokens, the timeframe provided to comply with such increase should be as short as possible since the relevant issuer, applying a proper and effective risk management, should always be adequately capitalised for the risks they face.
(5) Where a competent authority concludes that the risks, including volatility, of a particular asset-referenced token or e-money token might lead to a significant deterioration of the financial situation of the relevant issuer or impact its financial stability, the competent authority should set a shorter timeframe for the relevant issuer to increase the own funds.
(6) To ensure that issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens make sound risk management decisions, such issuers and their relevant competent authorities should understand the financial and operational risks that come with increased use of assetreferenced or e-money tokens. In addition, they should consider interlinkages with ecosystem of issuers of tokens more broadly and inherent interconnectedness with the traditional financial sector stemming from reserves of assets held. Therefore, it is necessary to further specify the stress testing of the solvency and liquidity risk of issuers.
(7) The impact of the so called ‘run-risk’, meaning a sudden spike in redemption requests of the tokens, resulting in a fire sale of the reserve assets backing the tokens, should be analysed via liquidity stress-testing. It is, therefore, essential to specify minimum features of the liquidity stress-testing such as those related to governance, data infrastructure, risk categorisation and frequency.
(8) To ensure that the results of the stress test remain relevant, solvency stress test should be carried out on a quarterly basis for issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens, and on a semi-annual basis for issuers of non-significant assetreferenced tokens or e-money tokens. The liquidity stress test should be carried out monthly.
(9) The stress testing should consider severe but plausible financial stress scenarios and non-financial stress scenarios, such as liquidity shocks, credit shocks, interest rate and exchange shocks, redemption risk and operational and third-party shocks. It should also ensure that the internal governance arrangements and the relevant data infrastructures are in place to allow issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens and competent authorities to understand the characteristics, quantify risks and gather evidence that such issuers are effectively allocating and mitigating risk on an ongoing basis.
(10) As a guiding principle, the stress testing programmes should follow similar rules and approach as to credit institutions stress testing under Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. However, considering that the risks of crypto-asset activities provided by issuers of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens other than credit institutions are different to those of credit institutions, it is necessary to group the crypto-asset activities into different risk categories for the purpose of the stress testing. Furthermore, grouping the crypto-asset activities and risks should ensure that issuers of the relevant tokens and competent authorities are able to identify all the functions, processes, and actors, along with their associated risks including any environmental, social, and governance factors, and identify any potential issues or risks. These identifications should facilitate the design and assignment of specific risk scenarios presented in the different activities of the relevant issuer. The scenarios should be well-defined in order to quantify their potential impact, the range of potential losses and the range of plausibility associated with the specific risk scenarios identified. Therefore, when identifying specific risks, the relevant issuer should specify the timeline of the stress scenario, which should be three years for the solvency stress test and up to one year for the liquidity stress test.
(11) This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted to the Commission by the European Banking Authority (EBA).
(12) The EBA has conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards upon which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the advice of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council